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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HAL E. HOLMSTEAD

'

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

ABBOTT G. M. DIESEL, INC.,

12257

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action against an employer to recover
damages for injuries allegedly sustained in a collision
in which an employee of the employer was involved.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant-appellant's (hereinafter referred to as
defendant) Motion for Summary Judgment was denied
by the trial court. This Court granted defendant's
petition for intermediate appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a determination by this Court that
the covenant not to sue executed by plaintiff-respondent
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')

(hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) in favor of defendant's employee is a bar to the claim against the employer.
STATEMENrr OF FACTS
The facts are simple and undisputed. This suit
arises out of an accident which occurred December 6I
1968, at the intersection of Lehi Main Street and the
frontage road to I-15 near Lehi in Utah County, Utah.
A vehicle owned and driven by plaintiff collided with a
vehicle owned and driven by one Gideon Allen. At the
time and place of the accident Gideon Allen was an agent
and employee of the defendant, Abbott GM Diesel, Inc.,
operating his said vehicle and acting within the scopB of
his employment. Plaintiff therefore seeks to hold defendant liable under the doctrine of master and servant or
respondeat superior. No independant or active negligence is alleged on the part of Abbott GM Diesel, Inc.
Suit was commenced by filing of the Complaint on
April 17, 1969 (R. 3) and Summons was served April

18, 1969 (R. 5). The employee Gideon Allen was not and
has not been named as a party to this action.
On July 7, 1969 in consideration of the payment in
behalf of said Gideon Allen of $10,000, plaintiff executed
and delivered a simple covenant not to sue in which he
did "covenant and agrre never to make any deman d or
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claim, or commence or cause or permit to be prosecuted
any action at law or in equity, or any proceeding of any
description, against Gideon Allen because of personal
injnry, disability, property damage, loss of services,
expense or loss of any kind ... sustained ... in consequence of an accident that occurred on or about the 6th
clay of December, 1968 at or near Lehi, Utah." (R. 31.)
On October 29, 1970 Abbott GM Diesel Inc. filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon' the pleadings, depositions and records on file and an affidavit of
Reed L. Martineau, which showed the undisputed facts
as set out above (R. 27-31).
Following four hearings on November 14, 1969 (R.
46), December 12, 1969 (R. 47), December 19, 1969 (R.
51) and January 2, 1970 (R. 54) on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the plantiffs in January, 1970, independently commenced an action in the District Court of
Utah County, Utah against Gideon Allen and Allstate Insnrance Company for reformation of the covenant not to
:sne dated July 7, 1969. Defendant Abbott GM Diesel, Inc.
was not made a party to that action even though its interest was known to plaintiff's counsel. A Decree of Reformation ,ms entered upon the default of Gideon Allen
and Allstah~ Insurance Company on March 11, 1970 (R.
32-34). By the Decree of Reformation the following paragraph was added to the covenant not to sue, which otherwis0 was left unchanged:
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"I hereby reserve all of my rights against
Abbott GM Diesel, Inc., including my right to
pursue the lawsuit which was filed in the District
Court of Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah
County, State of Utah, on the 17th day of April '
1969, entitled Hal E. Holmstead vs. Abbott
Diesel, Inc., Civil No. 33,121."

mr

Both parties filed written memorandums in support
of their respective positions with the lower court, and on
September 18, 1970 District Judge Joseph E. Nelson
denied the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 61).
Defendant thereupon filed its petition for intermediate
appeal (R. 64-66), which was granted January 8, 1971
(R. 63).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COVENANT NOT TO SUE IN FAVOR OF
AGENT, GIDEON ALLEN OPERATES AS A RELEASE OF THE EMPLOYER WHOSE LIABILITY,
IF ANY, IS WHOLLY DERIVATIVE.

It is clear that the liability here sought to be fastened
upon appellant is purely derivative under the doctrine
of respondeat superior. The alleged negligence is that

of the agent. The employer's liability, if any, must arise
· . · no
solely because of the, employment relationship smce
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5
active or independent negligence on the part of the employPr is or conld be shown undPr the facts here involved.
Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 2GG, 159 P.2d 149
(1945); 53 Am. J ur. 2d 41G, Master & Sen ant ~408.
Cases which have considered the precise question
here involved have held that 1vhere liability of a master
or principal for a tort committed by his servant or agent
arisPs solely under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
the injured person's covenant not to sue the servant
or agent operates to release the master or principal from
liability. Annotation, Release of (or Covenant Not to
Sue) master or principal as affecting liability of servant
or agent for tort, or vice versa, 92 ALR 2d 533, Section
7, p. 552-555, as supplemented in ALR 2d Later Case
Service.
In Holcomb vs. Flavin, 216 N.E. 2d 811 (Ill. 19GG),
a case very similar factually to the present case, the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that a covenant not to
sue the agent, in which no mention was made of the employer, was a bar to the injured party's claims against
the employer.

The court's opinion in that case rn

instructive here, so is quoted at some length.
"The covenant herein is a standard covenant
not to sue containing no reservations of rights
againt others and provides that 'this instrument
is and shall be construed as a cownant not to
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6
~ue as di_stinguished from a release.' No mention
is made m the covenant of the defendants in this
suit.

"'l1lie appellate court specifically rejected tlit·
view recognized by a number of cases from other
jurisdictions. In those cases the courts, although
recognizing the distinction between a release and
a covenant not to sue as applied to joint tortfeasors generally, have taken the view that where
the only liability of master or principal arises
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the
injured person's covenant not to sue the servant
operates to release the master or principal from
liability. The rationale of these cases is based
either upon the theory that such a result will
avoid circuity of action or that since the liability
of the master or principal is merely derivative
and secondary, exoneration of the servant
removes the foundation upon which to impute
negligence to the master or principal. Anno: 92
A.L.R. 2d 552, et seq.

"A leading case on the subject is Karcher v:;.
Burbank, 303 Mass. 303, 21 N.E. 2d 542, 124
A.L.R. 1292, where the court stated:
'The Company's (employer's) liability is
of a derivative or secondary character, rest.in ber solely
u1Jon the doctri~e of respondeat
•
superior. Panglntrn vs. Buick 111 otor Co.,
211 N.Y. 228, 234, 103 N.E. 423. The company was, in effect, the plaintiff's (employee's) surety, and could, therefore,
recover over against him if compellPd to pay
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damages for his negligence while he was
acting .as its agent within the scope of his
authority. Kramer vs. Morgan, 2d Cir. 85
F.2d 96. See Pittsley vs. Allen (297 Mass.
33), 7 N .E. 2d 442. It is a principle of the
law of suretyship that a release or covenant
not to sue the person known by the covenantor to be the principal will discharge the
surety.'
"A similar view was taken by the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Bacon vs.
United States, 321 F. 2d 880, where the court
stated:
'As the Missouri Supreme Court said in
Max, (Max vs. Spaeth, 349 S.W. 2d 1) the
master's liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior is based not on his own
misdeeds but those of his servant, and "therefore, when the servant is not liable, the
master for whom he was acting at the time
should not be liable." It matters little how
the servant was released from liability; as
long as he is free from harm, it appears to
us that his master should also be blameless'
(covenant not to sue executed by tort victim
in favor of servant tort-feasor).
"In Stewart vs. Craig, 208 Tenn. 212, 344 S.W.
2d 671, the court in a similar situation involving
a covenant not to sne the servant pointed out
that if a judgment were obtained against the
employer based upon the employee's negligence,
the employer ·would be entitled to sue the em-
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and ob~ain the same judgment against hirn.
Smee the plamtiff had given the employee the
covenant not to sue, the employee would be then
entitled to judgment against the plaintiff as wa~
originally obtained in the action against the em.
ployee, thus completing the circuit and the partie~
would come out in the same position as when the1
started. The court, therefore, held that a cove1;.
ant not to sue the servant extinguishes the cause
of action against the wrong-doer and therefore
extinguishes the cause of action against his
superior.

p~oyee

"See also Land vs. United States (D.C. Oki.),
231 F. Supp. 383, 385; Max vs. Speath (Mo.
Supp.), 349 S.W. 2d 1, 6; Jacobson vs. Parrill, 186
Kan. 467, 351 P.2d 194, 196; Barsh vs. Mullins
(Okl.), 338 P. 2d 845, 848; Bergeron vs. GiffortH ill (Ga.), 137 So. 2d 63 ; Carnal Insurance Co.
vs. W.ascom (La. App.), 148 So. 2d 89, 90; Smith
vs. South and Western R. Co., 151 N.C. 479, 60
SE. 435; Kelly vs. Ford Motor Company, 104 Ohio
App.185, 139 N.E. 2d 99.
"In the case at bar the trial court recognized
that if the defendants would have to respond
in damages, they could sue their alleged employee.
the covenantee, for the amount they had to pay.
The employee would then have to respond in the
very damages which the covenant was supposed
to guard against. ri~he contrary result reached by
the appellate court herein vmuld certainly in·.
volve an undesirable circuity and multiplicity ol
actions.
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"The appellate court stated that when Barnard
paid for the covenant, he is presumed to know
that if_ the plaintiff recovered from his employers
they, m turn, would seek indemnity from him.
Considering the conflict in the cases we do not
believe that the appellate court could fairly indulge in such a presumption. If the appellate
court conclusion is correct, there is a serious
question as to what Barnard got for his $16,000,
for he certainly did not buy his peace if he may
still ultimately be liable to, his employer. We
believe a more logical and satisfactory result
is reached by our holding in accordance with the
majority view, that the covenant not to sue the
servant or agent releases the master or principal
and we so hold. In line with the cases hereinbefore
cited a circuity of action will be avoided and
since the liability of the master or principal is
merely derivative and secondary, the exoneration
of the servant or agent prevents the imputing of
negligence to the master or principal."
The holding of the Holcomb case was reaffirmed in
American Nat. B. & T. Co. vs. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 238 N.E. 2d 385 (Ill. 1968), where the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
"As in the Holcomb case the plaintiff settled
his case based on the Milwaukee's negligence for
$75,000.00 and executed a covenant not to ~nfor~e
the judgment against it. The covenant i~ tlus
case must operate just as the covenant m the
H olcornb case. *** The relationship between the
defendants and the Milwaukee in this suit, therefore is IJreciselv the same as that between the

'

.
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driver and his employers in the Holcomb case.
The sole issue before this court is whether t] 1p
execution of a covenant not to enforce the judgment against an agent or servant operates to extinguish a claim against the principal or master,
whose liability, if any, arises under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. The answer must be in the
affirmative."
In the case of Stewart vs. Craig, 344 S.W. 2d 761
(Tenn. 1961), cited in the Holcomb case, the injured varty,
in consideration of the payment on behalf of the agent
of $16,000.00, executed a covenant not to sue. In a suit
subsequently brought against the employer the Supreme
Court of Tennessee held, as noted in the H olcomu case,
that a covenant not to sue the servant extinguished the
cause of action against the master.
In Simpson vs. Townsley, 283 F. 2d 743, (10th cir.
1960), 92 A.L.R. 2d 526, the plaintiff was injured in an
automobile accident which was alleged to have resulted
from the negligence of the agent, servant or employee of
the defendant employer. The plaintiff, in com;ideration
of the payment on behalf of the agent of $10,000.00,
executed and delivered a covenant not to sne the agent.
Thereafter suit was filed against the employer, hased
upon the alleged negligence of the agent. A motion for
summary
J·udament
on behalf of the defendant was
•
b
granted and on appeal it was snstaine<l. The 'l1enth
Circuit Court of Appeals tlwn· not<•d:
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''It is clear that Simpson's allecred cause of
actioi: is ba.sed on the doctrine of respondeat
snpenor. His complaint contains no allecrations
of. negligence on t~ie part of the r:rribune p~rtner
sl11p, or corpornt10n, of Goldenbelt. Rather, it
alkges that 'the negligence of Meda Oneida
Smith is likc,wise the n<>gljgence of tlw def Pndanh; ... '
"Under the law of Kansas there is no
distinction between the liability of a principal for
the tortious acts of his agent and the liability of
a master for the tortious acts of his servant. In
hoth relationships the liability is grounded upon
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under that
doctrine the liability of the master to a third person for injuries inflicted by a servant in the
course of his employment is derivative and
secondary and that of the servant is primary.
\¥here the liability of the master is not predicated
on any delict on his part, but solely on his secondary liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, the exoneration of the servant removes
the foundation upon which to impute negligence
to the master.
"Moreover, nnder the law of Kansas, while a
master whose liability is predicated solely on the
doctrine of respondeat superior and not on any
wrong on his part ma>- be sued jointly with his
sPrvai1t for a tort committed by the latter within
the scope of his employment, they are not joint
tort f easors in the sense they are equal wrongdo('l'S. \:Vherc a master becomes liable to a third
person for personal injuries caused solel>' by the
act of 11is servant, nnder the doctrine of respond-
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ea~ superior, a~d is required to respond to such

third person m damages by reason of such
liability, he 'vill be subrogated to tlw rights of
the injured third person and may recover over
from his servant who is primarily liable. ln
distinguishing the nature of the liability of the
servant and of the master, in Jacobson vs. Parrill,
186 Kan. 4G7, 351 P. :2d 194, 199, the Kansa~
Supreme Court said:
'Basically, there is no distinction to Le
drawn between the liability of the principal
for the tortious acts of his agent and tlte
liability of a master for the tortious acb
of his servant. \iVhile reference here i~
made only to the relation of master and
servant, it also pertains to the relation of
principal and agent. In either instance, the
liability is grounded upon the doctrine of
respondeat superior (2 Am. Jur, Agency,~
359, p. 278; 77 CJS Respondeat Superior
pp. 317-320). It has been held that under
that doctrine the liability of the master to
a third person for injuries inflicted by a
servant in the course of his employment and
within thP scope of his authority, is derivative and secondary, while that of the
servant is primary, ~nd aLsent any delict
of the master other than thrnngh the st>rvant the exoneration of the servant re' tlw foundation upon which to impute
moves
negligence to the matter ... '"
In Terry

t:s.

Memphis 8to11r and Gravel Co., 222 F.

2d G52 ( Gth Cir. 1955) tlw injured party for valuable
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13
consideration signed a covenant not to sue the agents.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals there held:
"Appellant, for a substantial and valuable consideration, signed a covenant not to sue the truck
owner, Sullivan, or the truck driver, Hyatt. Inasmuch as the liability alleged against the appellee
company rested solely upon the averment that
the truck driver was the servant or agent of the
appellee company for whose negligence it would
be responsible upon the principle of respondeat
sitperior, a covenant not to sue the truck owner
and the driver - appellee's alleged agents would necessarily release appellee. The case is
clearly distinguishable from those cases in which
a covenant not to sue one joint tort-feasor does
not protect another joint tort-feasor from an
action for damages brought against it by an
injured party."
In Karcher vs. Burbank, 21 N.E. 2d 542 (Mass,
1939), 124 A.L.R. 1292, a covenant not to sue executed by
the injured party in favor of the agent was held to bar
an action against the principal. The court there stated:
"The principal and his agent are liable in
separate actions to a third person for the agent:s
ne()'ligent acts cormnitted within the scope of his
authoritv both of which actions may be pursued
.'
until one satisfaction is obtained."

* *

~'

"In the case at bar if the company is chargeable
with the negligen~e of the plaintiff, it is only
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because his n~gligence is imputed to it by a rule
of law; and if, because of his neglicrence the
defendants were injured and the co~npady i~
compelled to pay damages, the plaintiff will be
bound to reimburse it."

''It is a principle of the law of smetyship that a
release or covenant not to sue the }Jerson known
by the covenantor to be the principal will ui~
charge the surety.n

"Whether or not the defendants knew of the
relationship between the plaintiff and the company when the covenant was entered into, they
must have known, on the record that is before ns,
that any claim they might then have against tlw
company on account of the plaintiff's nPgligence
would be of a deri,·ative charactel'."
It is respectfully submitted that, in view of the
foregoing authorities which repre~wnt the grPat majority
of decisions that have considered the question here involved, that plaintiff's execution and dPlivery of the
covenant not to sue the agent, Gideon Allen, operates to
extinguish and lmr any claim against his employer.
Abbott GM Diesel, Inc.

In plaintiff's writtc'n rnernornndtm1 filed with tl1r
lower court it was eonfrnded that und(•r Utah law an
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rmployer would have no right of indemnity over against
an employee for simple negligence such as is invoked
in the instant case (R. 41). Such right of indemnity,
l1owen~r, is a matter of simple hornbook law as ·will be
noted in 42 C.J.S. 89G-98, Indemnity, ~ 21, for example
\1·hen' it is stated:

"It is a ·well-recognized rule that an implied
contract of indemnity arises in favor of a person
who without any fault on his part is exposed to
liability and compelled to pay damages on account
of the negligence or tortious act of another, the
former having a right of action against the latter
for indemnity, provided they are not joint tort
f easors in such sense as to present recovery, as
dicussed infra Subsec. 27. This right of indemnity
is based on the principle that everyone is responsible for his own negligence, and if another person
has been compelled by a judgment of the court
having jurisdiction to pay the damages which
ought to ha·ve been paid by the wrong-doer they
mav be recovered from him. It exists independently ~f statute, and whether or not contractual relations exist between the parties, and whether or not
the negligent person owed the other a special or
particular legal duty not to be negligent."
* * *
"An agent or employee is li~ble to his principal or master for damages wh1ch the latter ·was
compelled to pay to third persons solely because
of the negligence or other wrongful act of the
agent or employee; and it is no defense to th~
~~Prvirnt that other persons were also culpable.
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The case of Salt Lake City -vs. Sclmbach, (Utah
1945), 159 P.2d 149, 108 Utah 2GG, supports this general
equitable rule that one whose negligence is passive all!!
derivative has a right of recovery on~r against t1H~ actin
tort-feasor. In Stewart vs. Craig, 344 S.\V. 2d 7Gl
(Tenn., 1961), the rrennessee Supreme Court stated that:
"The rule of law in this stafr, and universallr
so far as we know, that where the master ( defe1;dants in this case) is held liable for negligent acb
of his servant ( convenante(•) solely npon tl1P
doctrine of rcs1w11deat superior, the master in
turn has a causP of action against the se1Tant
for any ~neh amount for which h(• is lwld liahle."
The recent case of Eniployrrs' Fire I 11sitrancc Comprrn11
vs. Welch, ct al. (N.M. 1967), 433 P.2d 79, 78 N.M. 494,
also supports the general rul<-'. In this case the Ne\\
Mexico Supreme Conrt specifically held that an employer found liable on the tlwory of respondeat superior
may recover indemnification from the employet' wh('n
there is no active negligence on the part of such ernployer. See also IIa11cock vs. Berger, cited i11f ra.
POINT II
THE DECREE OF REFORMATION CAN HAVE
NO EFFECT ON THE PRESENT ACTION BECAUSE
DEFENDANT WAS NOT T1IADE A PARTY TO THE
ACTION FOR REFORMATTON.
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It is a "\vell established principle of law that all
persons who have a known interest must be made parties
to any suit for reformation of an instrument in order
to he bound by the proceedings. As stated in 45 Am.
J ur. G42, Reformation of Instruments, Sec. 93:

"Suits to reform written instruments are
subject to the general rule in Chancery that all
persons interested in the subject matter of litigation, whether it is a legal or equitable interest,
should be made parties, so that the court may
settle all of their rights at once and thus prevent
the necessity of a multiplicity of suits. As a
general rule, the refore, all persons to be affected
by the proposed reformation must be made
parties."
This rule is salutary in its effect because courts
should not deal lightly with the solemnly expressed
terms of a written instrument.

Much stronger and

clearer evidence is required to permit a reformation
than in an ordinary action for damages. See 45 Am.
.Tur. 651, Reformation of Instruments, ~ 116. Only where
all known interested persons are represented in the
reformation proceeding can there be assurance that all
relevant evidence is made available to the court, in aid
to its decisions.
That the employer has a recognized legal interest
in

a covenant not to sne executed in favor of the em-
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ployee tortfeasor is clear from 4 Corbin on contract 8
747-48 which states:
"An empl?yer may be liable for tortions injmy
caused by Ins employee, solely by the doctrine
~esp01_ideat superior, as the best method of carryrng nsks and compensating the injured. The
employer may then bl~ held to have a right to full
indemnity against the active wrongdoer. In such
a case, settlement by which the injured party
covenants with the active wrongdoer that he :,;hall
not have to pay anything more on account of the
injury migl1t be held, by analogy with contrad
suretyship, to operate• as a complete discharge of
the employer. 8nch should certainly he the holding, if the injured party covenants ·with the actin
wrongdoer that he will not thereafter bring any
action to press any claim, either against thf'
covenantee or against anyone' else. If, in breach
of this cov<~nant, the injnred party brings suit
against the ernplo)·er, the latter should Jia-rr a
d<:>fense as a third party lw1w ficiary; and thP
co1-<.'nanke himself ~~110nld he able to enfol'C(' tlH'
cov<->nants Rpecificall_\- l)y injnndio11.''
In tl1e cmw of Allrr11tic Coo:·d J.)iJ1e fl. Co. l's. Boo111',

85 Ro. 2d 831, 57 .A.L.H. 2d 1 J~:Ci (Fla. ]!J5(i), tlw railroad

Rnccessfnlly ass('rtc'd a J'('~<·;i_c'<' <':\Prnted L!'1 \\"e<·n the
plaintiff and a 11cglig-1·nt dri\"('J" of nnotl:Pr a:,tornol1ik
on tlrn theor.'' that it

1rn:-;

a third 1iart,\- 1>c1wi'i('iar.1.

~ . .
v ·7 ". ' ' ',. ()(" 1\_ »(l (ij~.
Atlrmhc
]'.,Tort11rr11.:11rl11u·s 1··-:. !Ii 11, ilnl/1( .• • 1" - - •
12 N . .J. ::?!J~ (1:J;)~~), ~;rnil~<il ..- l10l<l 1l1at n y;i.hl n·lea:;i•
,
r· j] J(' •tl'-.•l:n
., . .,<·('J.<'' 1~ 1 .,, •• ,;,id all
()t'l
of all clnirn:;
(I!

~'-,"'!(,_
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pen;ons connected therewith given by the plaintiff was
plradable as a defense by other persons not parties to
tlte instrument. See also J. A. Leigerber, et al. vs. Scott,
83 So. 2d 246 (Ala. S.C., 1955), where in an equity suit
by the guardian of an incompetent for reformation of
a clf~ccl, the court held that all persons whose interests
in tlw subject matter, legal or equitable, who would be
immediately or consequentially affected by the decree
WPl'e necessary parties in a suit for reformation.
The foregoing rule should apply with full force
under the facts of t1w present case in which the def endant's direct interest in the covenant not to sue was
well knffwn, the covenant ha\'ing been specifically raised
as a bar to the present suit, and in which the Decree

of Reformation ·was thereafter

ent(~red

n110n defanlt

1rithout dt'fendant having been joined as a party. Such
deliberate disregard of defendant's vital interest in an
att0mpt to nnilaterally circumvent the effect of the covP1iant

not to snr which defendant had no part in pre-

or executincr
cannot he r)ermitted. In order to
JJ<1 t·ino·
b
•
b'

lw honnd by the decrl'e, defendant mnst have heen made
a pnrtv to the reformation snit so that it could be repre~Pnt(~d on the issues involnd rather than having th<~

1natter settled on the basis of a default. Defendant not
having lwen made a party to the reformation suit, the

D('(·1·ee of Reformation ran lwve no effect in the present

(·a:.:e and should be en hre ly cli~rPgarclPd.
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POINT III
THE COVENANT NOT TO SUE COULD NOT
PROPERLY

BE

REFORMED

TO

INCLUDE

A

RESERVATION NOT CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL COVENANT AS EXECUTED.

Plaintiff's attempt to reform the covenant in the
manner attempted in the reformation suit is invalid
and improper. Applicable cases have so held.
For example, in llhtse vs. DeVito, (Mass. 1923),
137 N. E. 730 it was held that where a release was
absolute and unconditional it must be given full effect
and could not be varied by parol evidence introduced
to show that the plaintiff intended to reserve whatever
rights she had against a joint tortfeasor. The defendant
there had excepted to the admission of parol evidence
as to what was said to the plaintiff by the attorney in
whose presence the release was signed and as to her
intention at the time to reserve a right of action against
others who might be legally responsible.
In Reid vs. LowdPn (La. 1939), 189 So. 28G it was
held that where there was nothing in a written compromise settlement and release to f'how that the plaintiff

intended to reserve his rights against another tortfrasor
and there was no ambiguity, parol evidence was not
admissible to prove the alleged n•S('J'Vation. rrhp Conrt
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there stated that since the parties had reduced their
agreement of settlement and discharge to writing and
since the writing contained no reservation of rights, the
plaintiff was bound by the agreement and could not alter
or change it by parol evidence.
In Freedman vs. Montagne Associates, Inc. (N.Y.
J959), 187 N.Y.S. 2d 636 it was held that a release could
not be varied by parol evidence to show that the plaintiff was releasing only his interest in commissions.
As can be noted from the foregoing cases, the plaintiffs cannot, after having settled their claims against the
em11loyee Gideon Allen by a clear, complete and unambiguous instrument, later attempt to vary the clear terms
of that instrument by parol evidence and change it
on a default decree from a sow's ear into a silk purse.
So even if defendant had been made a party to that
suit, the covenant was and is not subject to reformation
in the manner attempted by plaintiff.
POINT IV
THE COVENANT NOT TO SUE, EVEN AS REFORMED, IS A BAR TO THE PRESENT SUIT.

Assuming, 'lvithout conceding, that the reformation
dccn'P were valid and binding on defendant, the CoY-

enallt not to Sue Gideon Allen, even as reformed, would
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still be a bar to the present suit against his t•mployer,
under the majority and best-reasoned casPs tliat han
ruled on the precise issue invoked.
In Barsh vs. illu.llins (Okla. 1~)59), 338 P.2<l 845,
the plaintiff had settled with the driver and PXPcuted
a release and covenant not to sue in which claims were
expressly reserved as against lWrsons not speeifically
ref erred to in the release and covenant not to sue. The
Court there held that, notwithstanding the express reservations, the release and covenant was a bar as to all
persons and entities ·whose liability was derivative in
nature. The Court stated:
" ( 5) If this were a case involving ordinary
joint tortfeasors, each guilty of independent and
concurring negligence, it is clear that a release
of this type would not realease those joint tortfeasors not named. All American Bus lines vs.
Saxon, 197 Okl. 395, 172 P. 2d 424. In such cases
primary considera6on is given to the intent of the
person executing the release. If, howe·ver~ tlw
claimed liabilitv of defrndants for the negligent
acts of Hall and Barsh Produce Co. is derivatiw
in nature, a different rnle is applicable.
"In Ford Motor Co. vs. Tomlinson, G Cir., 229
F.2d 873, 877, the court pointed ont t.hat .under
Ohio law an injured p<:>rson could ordrnanl)~ n'lc~ase one joint tortfrasor and lat<>r recover frolll
the remaining tortfrasors if the right to do so "-a~
Pxpressl)- n's<:·n·pd in the> r0l('nse. Bnt the court
further said:
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' ... in Ohio the release of a tort-feasor
primarily liable ordinarily operates to release one secondarily liable, regardless of an
attempt to reserve rights against the latter.
Hillyer vs. City of East Cleveland 1951 155
Ohio S~. 552, 99 N.E. 2d 772. See' Terr~ vs.
Memphis Stone and Gravel Co., 6 Cir., 1955,
222 F. 2d 652 .... '
"In one of the cited cases, Terry vs. Memphis
8tone & Gravel Co., the court used the following
language (222 F. 2d G53):
'Appellant, for a substantial and valuable com;ideration, signed a covenant not to
sue the truck o-wner, Sullivan, or the truck
driver, Hyatt. Inasmuch as the liablity
alleged against the appellee company rested
solely upon the averment that the truck
driver was the servant or agent of the
appellee company for whose negligence it
would be responsible upon the principle of
respondeat superior, a covenant not to sue
the truck owner and the driver - appellee's
alleged agents - would necessarily release
appellee. The case is clearly distinguishable
from those cases in which a covenant not to
sue one joint tort-feasor does not protect
another joint tort-feasor from an action for
damages brought against it by an injured
part)'.'
''In Giles vs. Smith, 80 A. App. 540, 56 S.E.
2d SGO, 8G2, the conrt said:
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'\Vh~re the liability, if any, of the master
to a tlurd person is purely derivative and dependent en~irely npon the principle of respon .
deat supenor, and although not teclmicalh a
joint-tortfeasor, the master may be st;ed
almw or jointly with the servant on tlw
merits (and by analogy, a release of tlw
servant from liability, 35 Am. J ur. 9G3, 5;~±)
will bar an action against the master, where
the injury and damages are the same.'

''\Ve have rec-0gnized and applied the rules
hereinabove announced. In Mid-Continent Pipeline Company vs. Crauthers, Okl., 2G7 P.2d 568,
571, the plaintiff executed a release and covenant
not to sue in favor of defendant's agents for a
consideration of $300. Therein, as in the case
before us, the release expressly reserved a right
of action against any other persons who might
have caused or assisted in causing plaintiff's
damage.

* * *
"We held that the release of the agent rel(,ased
the principal and revt>rsed ·with directions to
enter judgment for def Pndant.
The Court held that th<> defendant's liahilit~-, if an),
was derivative in nature, an<l <'Onclnded:

"It therefore follows that the release of those

who were guilty of the primary negligenc(~ cxtin. t.ors. "
gnislws t11e liahility of th<> otlwr conspim
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Barch vs. J.l1idlins, siipra, held that the master is
not a joint tort-feasor, and that a release of the servant,
whatever the intent or attempted reservation, of neces::;ity rdeases the master.
In Willi.ams vs. M arionucaux (La. 1960), 124 So.
2d 91!J, the Lonisiana Supreme Court in a well-reasoned
opinion held that an employer was released by a covenant
not to ime executed between his employee and the injured
party, notwithstanding an express reservation of rights
as to the employer contained in the CO\'enant. This
was a suit for injuries caused by a pipe, protruding from
a passing logging truck. The employer, Marionneaux,
filed a third party complaint against its employee,
Blanchard, claiming indemnity for any loss it might sustain as a result of the employee's primary negligence.
Blanchard then filed a third party complaint back against
plaintiff Williams, pleading the covenant not to sue
obtained by him from the plaintiff and thus completing
the circle.
Tho court there found that the master's liability
was based solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior,
that he therefore conld not be considered a joint tortf <·asor and that his liability was secondary to and de-

'

.

]H:•nd<'nt upon that of the servant.
The> court reasoned as follows:
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. "Since Marionneaux had the ri b<rht to n•co 111 ,
±rom Blanchard 1Yhatever damages he might han

been obliged to pay plaintiff for injmies resultin"
from Blanrhard's negligence wltilt the lattvr wa~
acting in furthcram·c> of his duties as .:\Iarion1
'
.
nL•unx::;
Plll]J10~-l <', tl tl' q1ws t"1011 arises
a:s to tlH·
legal effect prodnc<'d hy the cornprorni:s<~ and
settlement by plaintiff of his claim against
Blanchard, in which he con•nanted to indemnifr
and save Blanchard harmless for all claims an;!
demands for damage::; gTo\ring out of the accident.
This release, in our view, not only operated to
discharge Blanchard as the party primarily
responsible; it effected a complete relea:se of
:Marionneaux, who was only secondaril~' liable.
And this, despite the attempted reservation by
plaintiff in the release of all his rights against
Marionneaux and his liability insurer."
1

1

* * *
"Now, when Blanchard compromised with plaintiff, he repaired his wrong and, therefore, w~~s
fully acquitted from further liability. Tlm
acquittance inun•d to the benefit of 1\Iarionneanx
for the rt>lease of the tort-feasor must he held to
release Marionneaux also from further responsibility, as his liabilit~- for tlrn tortions act 1ra~
Yicarious in nature and derived sole l~- from lm
legal n·lation to the wrongdoer.
"To cive lq:;-al pffret to tl1c~ l"'f·wrrntion
containect in tlw relc~ase, a:s plaintiff would har('
ns do wonld lll'odnce conspq1wnees of' a most
"""l'Cl1.l"r
till'
nnscern'] \' 11at nre - f' 01,· no t11·:tl-l
1
::il<-'
•r-. th·1t
<
tort-fra;or has already r•·paire<1 th<' wron,l;'
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conformably with Article 2315, Marionneaux
would be entitled to reimbursement from Blanchard, as t~ie party primarily responsible, and
Blanchard, m turn, would be entitled to indemnification from plaintiff as he contractually agreed
to save Blanchard and his insurer harmless for
all claims and demands for damages on account
of the accidPnt." 124 So. 2d 921-923.
A similar result 1rns reached in a case involving an
attempted reservation of rights against a municipality
incident to execution of a covenant not to sue the primary, or active, tort-feasor, in Lee v. City of Baton
Rouge (La. 1962), 1±1 So. 2d 125. The court there carefully distinguished between the liability of joint tortfeasors and that of a passively-negligent governmental
entity and concluded that such attempted express reservation of rights against the governmental entity was
ineffective. It stated:
"As counsel for defendants have aptly put it, '\Ve
would have an endless circle of legal futility.
"In addition to the above argument that
allowing plaintiff to proceed with this su~t. would
only result in an endless circle of legal futility, we
find many authorities holding that release of the
primary obligor also disch~r~es the secondary
obligor because this result is mescapable under
the laws of subrogation. It is elementary that
where the claimant sues only the party secondarily liable he is then snbrogated to the rights of
the .claimant and lPgally stands in his shoes. He
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has all of the rights, but is also subject to all of
the limitations of the surbrogator." 141 So 2d 125

133.

.

,

The rule of the above cases also applies in surety.
ship law. Slatoff vs. Theitrich (N.J. 1938), 199 A. 4g,

123 N. J. Eq. 593.

As noted in the foregoing cases, the injustice of
permitting the injured person's claim to be indirectly
asserted against the employee through the employer is
just as much present in cases of an attempted reservation as in cases where no reservation is attempted. So
in addition to the advantages of a logical and consistent
application of the respondeat superior doctrine, the rule
releasing the employer under the present facts also
avoids the double exposure of the employee to liability
with its attendant expense, circuity of action and multiplicity of suits.
In this case, if reformation of the original covenant
is permitted, and the reservation therein held to be effective ' any
. loss incurred bv. Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. after
execution of the release by Gideon Allen would entitle
it to be reimbursed from its employee, Gideon Allen,
for all sums it was required to pay. Gideon Allen, in
turn could then maintain a claim back to the plaintiff
'
for breach of the covenant given to him. The rnle making the covenant not to sue• a bar, despite an atternptr.d
reservation as to the emplo:·er, logically prevents tlus
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"circle of futility" from occurring and preserves to the
employee the peace for which he paid $10,000 to plaintiff. By the covenant plaintiff promised and agreed
''never to make any demand or claim, or commence or
cause or permit to be prosecuted any action at law or in
equity, or any proceeding of any description against
Gideon Allen." Yet by pnrsuing his claim against Abbott
GM Diesel, Inc., Gideon Allen will be subject to further
liability contrary to the covenant provisions.
In the lower court plaintiff relied upon two New
York lower court cases which upheld a reservation of
rights in covenants not to sue against persons liable
only under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The
case of Wilson v. Econom (1968) 56 Misc. 2d 272, 288
NYS 2d 381, involved a malpractice action against an
attorney. In one sentence the court without explanation
or citation to authority found a reservation of rights
against all other parties except the attorney himself
was valid.
The second case, Wilson v. City of New York (1954)
131 NYS 2d 47, involved a private citizen who sued
New York City for an alleged assault upon him by a
police officer. The Supreme Court for Kings County,
trial term, in its opinion did not discuss the problem of
circuity of action and multiplicity of suits inherent in
allowing the action against the master after release of
th(_• servant.
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The California case of Ellis v. Jewett Rhoades Motor
Company (1939), 29 Cal. App. 2d 395, 84 P.2d 791, a
case cited in the Wilson case sitpra, and also extensiveh
quoted by plaintiff in the lov\'er court brief (H. 41-±2.!
is distinguishable from tht• present case because th~re
the particular covenant not to sue given to the employee
for consideration did not by its terms protect him from
a subsequent indemnity rlaim hy the employer. Tl1e
court there stated:
"In the instant case Jewett, knowing he might
in the future be compelled to meet a demand for
reimbursement by appellant, agreed that respondent should retain his right to proceed against
appellant."
The court in Ellis, supra, distinguished an Ohio case,

Bello v. City of Cleveland, 106 Ohio St. 94, 138 N.E. 52G,
on the basis that the intention of the persons receiving
the covenant not to sue in Bello was that they would
not further be subject to a suit by the city on an indemnity theory.

A second case, Braum v. Town of Louisburg, 12°
N.C. 701, 36 S.E. 166, 78 Am. St. Rep. 677, was also
distinguished by the court in Ellis on the basis that the
covenant given there protected the employee both directly
and indirectly from future exposure. rrhe Brown ca~e
was explained as follows:
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'_'The court held that Ponton (the party
paymg) must be protected in his right under the
contract, and he could not be protected if the city
of Louisburg were called to recover from him
whatever damages it might be compelled to pav
plaintiff. Such an effect would be a complet~
d<'strnction of his right under his contract with
plaintiff." 84 P.2d 791, 793.
rrhe ruling in Ellis, supra, \VOuld be harsh unless
the employee or agent paying for a covenant not to sue
expressly and unequivocally agrees and understands that
his attempt to "buy his peace" may be rendered a nullity
8hould his employer be further held responsible and
then comes back against him. The covenant not to sue

given to Gideon Allen purports to settle completely his
exposure regarding the accident in question in the following language:
"I do hereby covenant and agree ... never to
make any demand or claim, or commence or cause
or permit to be prosecuted any action at law or
in equity, or any proceeding of any descriz:tion,
agciinst Gideon Allen (for injuries ... sustamed)
... in consequence of an accident that occurred on
or about the 6th day of December, 1968, at or near
Lehi, Utah.

"I understand that the parties to whom this
<'ovenant extends admit no liability of any sort
hy reason of said accident and that the payment
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above recited is made to terminate f 11rthcr control:ersy respecting all claims for damar;es that I
have heretofore asserted or that I or my personal
represeutafri;es might hereafter assert agai11st
Gideon Allen bcc(mse of said accident.'' (H 3~-33).
(Emphasis a( ldPd.)
The foregoing provisions are inconsistt•nt with aml
contradictory to the parn.grnph added in tlw decn'(' of
reformation which 1nuport(•d to n'Sl'l'\'(' as agaillst tliP
defendant in the present suit and would, if valid, suhj0ct
the employee to further liability to the employ0r, contrary to the provisions of the COYPnant quoted above.
The Federal case of Bacon, ct al. v. United States,
321 Fed. 2d 880 (8th Cir., 1963), involved a similar problem of interpreting an ambiguous covenant not to sue.
In that case an action was brought against the Unikd
States under the Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained
in a collision in Missouri between an antomohile owned
by the plaintiffs and an automobile o-wned by the United
States and driven by one of its employees. The employ<<'
and his personal insurer settled with the plaintiffs and
received a covenant not to sne, ·which speeificall.'; l'('served the plaintiffs' claim for the damage dmw to
their automohik as a result of tl1« accident and spPeifiealh- resen-ed all cbims against tl1t• Unit<>d States. Tn
a snhsequent suit aguinst tlte 1~nit(•d Stat<·~, t11e GoYentment pleaded that it was rd<.'US<'d lJ~· virtne of the eoYt•nant, n otwi thstandi ng· tlw re:3r•rya ti on. Both t!w frdnal
district conrt and the• Stli C'1re11it n~1 c'~·<l tlint th» eO\·-
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enant not to sue was contradictory by its own terms,
presumably because the master, if sued, could claim
indemnity back against the employee and indirectly result in further liability to the employee. The court found
that the instrument, regardless of the attempted reservation of rightt::> against others, completely released the
government from any liahilit~r to tlw plaintiff.
Another case relied upon by plaintiff in the lower
court is United States v. First Security Bank, 208 F.2d
424 (10th Cir. 1953). That case involved a suit commenced in the Central District of Utah against the
United States under the Federal T'ort Claims Act for
injuries sustained when Mardis, a mail carrier, allegedly
retarded the speed of his automobile causing the driver
following him to jack-knife a house trailer he was towing
into the opposite lane and against an approaching car .
.Judge Ritter entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and
that judgment was sustained on appeal.
The Court of appeals there, however, noted that
under the· provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2676 the U.S. Government had no right of indemnity or subrogation against
the employee, a significant distinction from the present
case. The court there then erroneously concluded that
an employer and his employee although not joint tortf easors "in the sense that their joint acts caused an

injury" are nevertheless jointly and severally liable and
that the "law of joint tortfeasors relating to releases

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3±
and covenants not to sue is ap1Jlicabk'." Such a conclntion fails to recognize the basic nature of the employeremployee relationship as explained in the cases ahon.
This Court in Salt Lake City v. Sclmbach, supra, announced the law of Utah with regard to the relationship
between one whose negligence is active and another
whose negligence is passive or secondarv:
"Notwithstanding the city's liability to the
public, it was under no duty to notify appellant
of a condition of appellant's own creation. It was
not a wrongdoer as between itself and appellant.
The city and appellant were not in p:ari delicto;
they were not joint tortfeasors. (Emphasis added.)
In reaching its decision, the Federal Court overlooked the Schitbach case and believing this Court had
not ruled on the issue, that it was free to make its own
interpretation as to Utah law. That erroneous interpretation is not binding on this Court.
Further it vv'ill be noted that two other Federal
Circuit Courts have ruled on the· effect of a covenant
not to sue with reservation against the United States
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, t>ach with a
different holding than that in the First Security Ea11k
case. The case of Bacon vs. United States, ;:.:,upra, by
the 8th Circuit ten years after the First Security Bauk
case, found that under 1\lissonri law a con'nant not to
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sue given to an employee also relt>ased the United States,
even though a specific rt>servation was contained in the
covrnant. Plaintiffs argued that 37 R.S. Mo. ~ 537.060
(,T.A.M.S., 1949 Ed.) provided (as does Utah) that a
coYPnant not to sue a joint tortfrasor may <•xprPssl>·
reserv<> plaintiff's tlairn again::;t othPr joint tortfrasors.
The court, howevC>r, ado1itPd the general rnle that where
the master can be held liahle only under the theory of
respondeat superior, he is not a joint tortfeasor. The
court reasoned that when the s0rvant is released, the
master for whom he was acting at the time should also
be released. The court referred to the First Security
Bank case, sitpra, but declined to adopt its ruling that
"the law of joint tortfeasors relating to releases and
covenants was applicable to respondeat superior situations."
The Federal case of Munson vs. United States, 380
F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1967), was brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act against the United States as a result
of an automobile accident involving a Government employee. The employee settled separately with the plaintiff, and received a covenant not to sue specifically
reserving to the plaintiff a cans<~ of action against the
United States. A Motion by the United States for Summary .JudgmPnt was granted by the lower court, constrning Ohio law. On appeal, the 6th Circuit reversed,
hut did so on the ground that suits agajnst the United
~tates did not involve the nsnal employee-employer sitnation.
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The court there acknowleged the distinction between
cases involving joint tortfeasors and cases involvin"b
derivative liability:
" ... the authorities on the subject emphasize
that the reason for such a rule was to protect the
normal right of indemnity which the master holds
by subrogation to any judgment rendered him in
favor of the plaintiff.

* * *
"In the case of a settlement with the servant,
no indication of the servant's liability is given and
there is no reason to release the master except
to protect him from having to bear the full burden
of plaintiff's remedy when his rights against the
servant are destroyed."
The court in Mimson concluded that, because the
United States Supreme Court in United States vs. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 74 S. Ct. 695, 98 L. Ed. 898 (1954),
had specifically held the :B,ederal Tort Claims Act did
not place the Federal Government in the shoes of a
common law employer, it did not therefore have the
common law right of indemnity against a negligent employee normally accorded any emplo>·er whose negligence is purely vicarious and the reason for construing
the covenant to release the United States from liability
had ceased to exist. That rationale should not he applied
where, as here, the right of indemnit>· of tlw Prnployer
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Abbott GM Diesel still exists in full force. The M wnson
case reinforces the general rule by noting the distinctions
which apply in claims under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.
As pointed out in the foregoing discussion, the First
Security Bank case erroneously interprets the rule which
should apply under the facts of the present case. It is
not binding as precedent on this Court. The better rule,
as outlined in the cases cited above, releases the employer where a covenant not to sue is executed in favor
of the employee, whether or not there is an attempted
reservation as against the employer. This is especially
so where as here, the language of the covenant, as supposedly reformed, is inconsistent and contradictory and
leaves the employee open to further liability.
CONCLUSION
The covenant not to sue executed by plaintiff in
favor of the employee, Gideon Allen, for consideration
operates as a release of the employer, Abbott GM Diesel,
Inc. The attempt by plaintiff to reform the covenant
to include an express reservation as against the defendant in this action can have no effect where, as here, the
direct and substantial interest of defendant was known
to plaintiff at the time the reformation snit was filed
hut defendant was not joined as a party. In any event
the covenant was not snbjt'Ct to reformation in the man-
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ner attempted by plaintiff. Finally, even if the covenant
as reformed, were binding in this action, which defendant
does not concede, it would, nevertheless, operate as a
release of the defendant under the better reasoned case8,
which represent the majority view. This Court should
enter its order directing the entry of summary judgment
in favor of the defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
and Reed L. Martineau
Seventh Floor
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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